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Constitutional provisions, statutes and common law
rules of criminal procedure, desigmed to protect an individual's privacy and security, require that most
searches and seizures in the Anglo-American system of
jurisprudence be conducted pursuant to a warrant. The
Fourth Amendment of the Constitution of the United
States, now applicable to the states, Mapp v. Ohio, 367
U. S. 643, 81 S. Ct. 1684, 6 L. Ed. 2d 1081 (1961), explicitly limits searches and seizures and outlaws the
broad, general warrants and writs of assistance of the
eighteenth century.
This is not to say, however, that a properly-drawn
search warrant is necessary in every case before officers
can conduct a search.
Since the requirement of a valid warrant is for the
individual's own protection, he can waive this requirement by an effective consent. White, Effective Consent
to Search and Seizure, 113 U. PA. L. REv. 260 (1964).
But, can someone else waive this requirement for him?
This question provides the nucleus of this article, with
emphasis on the cases in which a member of the suspect's
family agrees to the search and seizure.
The courts have spun a web of protection around this
concept of consensual waiver of the Fourth Amendment
(and state constitutional) guarantees, closely scrutinizing each case in an effort to see that no one loses his
fundamental rights without an intentional relinquish-
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ment thereof. Especially is this true when someone other
than the suspect himself has agreed to the search and
seizure.
The courts, understandably, have been reluctant to allow another member of the family to waive a person's
constitutional rights. The rationale behind this reluctance, however, is too often muddled by a confusion of
two separate and distinct problems:
(1) The problem of freely-given consent-i.e., whether the alleged permission was freely and voluntarily
given so as to constitute consent.
(2) The problem of capacity to consent-i.e., whether
a member of the suspect's family can, in any case, make
a waiver by consenting to a search and seizure.
This article deals with these two problems under separate headings in an effort to avoid the confusion in
which the courts find themselves when they fail to make
such a distinction.
I. CONSENT-WAS IT FREELY GIVEN?
A. General Consideration
It must be assumed at the outset, as a basis for this
article, that the officers seeking to search the premises
do not have a valid search warrant. Obviously, if the
officers have a proper warrant, they do not have to obtain prior consent from anyone before they conduct a
reasonable search and seizure. What constitutes a valid
search warrant, and what can be seized pursuant to such
a warrant, are problems beyond the scope of this article. It must further be assumed that the officers seeking
to search the premises are not doing so incident to a
valid arrest. If a valid arrest has been made, a reasonable search of the area can be made without a search
warrant, without approval of the suspect or anyone else.
KAuPER, ConstitutionalLaw 936 (2d ed. 1960). Thus, it
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must be supposed for this discussion of consent that
the only way in which the search and seizure can be upheld is for the suspect to have effectively consented to
it.
Although the federal courts have been conspicuous in
their failure to explore this problem in detail, the Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia has laid down
some general guidelines in Judd v. United States, 190 F.
2d 649 (D. C. Cir. 1951):
Such a waiver of consent must be proved by clear
and positive testimony, and it must be established
that there was no duress or coercion, actual or implied.... The Government must show a consent that
is unequivocal and specific . . ., freely and intelligently given. (190 F. 2d at 651).
The states are now required to measure up to these
federal standards in applying the Fourth Amendment.
It has been suggested previously that the courts, both
federal and state, are even more reluctant to find freelygiven consent when members of the suspect's family attempt to waive the suspect's rights than when the suspect himself permits the search. This is particularly true
where the wife has supposedly consented to a search
of the premises. In fact, as is noted below, some courts
have gone so far as to close the door on any searches
conducted pursuant to permission given by the wife
simply because, as these courts say, the very presence
of officers intimidates the wife.
B. The Cases
The first case in this field handed down the United
States Supreme Court, and the one on which many
courts have since relied, is Amos v. United States, 255
U. S. 313, 41 S. Ct. 266, 65 L. Ed. 654 (1920). In Amos,
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revenue officers went to the home of the defendant, were
allowed to enter by the wife, and subsequently found incriminating evidence. The Court, in reversing the conviction, concluded that "it is perfectly clear" that
"implied coercion" was, in fact, present. No authorities
were cited on this point, and the whole matter was disposed of in summary fashion. Thus was born the phrase
"implied coercion" which apparently means that the
presence and demeanor of the law enforcement officers
frightened and coerced the wife.
A raft of state court cases can be found citing, often
without comment, Amos and its "implied coercion" doctrine, but no case has expanded the doctrine to the limits
reached in Byrd v. State, 161 Tenn. 306, 30 S. W. 2d 273
(1930). The facts were similar to those in Amos, also involving an alleged violation of the revenue laws, but apparently the officers were more polite to Byrd's wife,
who permitted them to enter. Despite the suaveness of
the men in blue, the Tennessee court was not convinced;
it struck down the conviction for these reasons:
While the sheriff apparently approached [the
wife] more courteously [than did the officers in the
Amos case], the essential elements of implied coercion appear to have been equally present. The
phraseology differed, but the situation presented to
the wife was substantially the same .... Duress is
not less controlling because accomplished by polite
means. Confronted at her door by three officers of
the law seeking admission, we cannot avoid the conclusion that the record fails to show, as it should,
that this ignorant woman [quaere: what. does this
mean?] acted freely and voluntarily. (30 S. W. 2d at
273).
The Kentucky court has also expanded the Amos rule.
In Dunwan v. Commonwealth, 198 Ky. 841, 250 S. W. 101
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(1923), the facts again being similar to those in Amos,
the court relied exclusively on Amos and held that "the
wife, by reason of the coercive situation implied from
the presence of the officers of the law," could not under
the circumstances waive her husband's rights and effectively consent to the search for illicit liquor.
Many courts have not been persuaded by these decisions; they recognize the decisions for what they are:
efforts to formulate a policy whereby wives cannot under any circumstances waive the suspect's constitutional
guarantees. The majority of the courts which have seen
fit to formulate such a policy have done so candidly,
without using this idea of implied coercion as a front.
The better view concerning this idea of consensual
waiver is stated by Varon, in his work on searches and
seizures:
The mere fact that a police officer puts in an appearance . . . does not necessarily constitute coercion. It is the manner and method in which the police
officer makes his wishes known, that would have a
bearing upon the determination as to whether or
not coercion was employed. I VARoN, Searches, Seizures, and Immunities 446 (1961).
An oft-quoted decision which follows this view is
People v. Galle, 153 Cal. App. 2d 88, 314 P. 2d 58 (1957).
In that case, officers went to the defendant's house on a
tip that the defendant possessed narcotics. Pursuant to
the officer's request for admission, the mother of the
defendant said, "Go right ahead." Marijuana was
found in the defendant's coat. In upholding the conviction, the court acknowledged that while there is some
reason for the argument that every request or demand
by an officer for permission to search is to some extent
coercive, "considered alone, it does not render the consent involuntary as having been obtained by coercion."
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The only reported case in Virginia involving this matter of consent is the recent case of Rees v. Commonwealth, in which the defendant was convicted of murder.
F.B.I. agents were given permission by the defendant's
parents to search the home of the parents, and subsequently the agents found a gun which was introduced
into evidence as the murder weapon. The defendant objected to the introduction of this evidence (1) on the
ground that his parents could not waive his constitutional rights and allow the search (discussed infra), and
(2) on the ground that, even if the parents could permit
such a search, they were coerced in this case and thus
the consent was ineffectual. The court concluded that
the parents of the defendant had freely, voluntarily, and
intelligently consented to the search and the subsequent
seizure of the evidence. The court said that there was
no coercion, actual or implied, and no trickery or fraud
was involved. The conviction was upheld. Bees v. Commonwealth, 203 Va. 850, 127 S. E. 2d 406 (1962); cert.
denied, Rees v. Virginia, 372 U. S. 964, 83 S. Ct. 1088, 10
L. Ed. 2d 128 (1963). In denying a writ of habeas corpus,
the federal courts agreed with the Virginia court on
this issue, as well as on the other issues raised. Rees v.
Peyton, 225 F. Supp. 507 (E. D. Va. 1964); affirmed in
341 F. 2d 859 (4th Cir. 1965).
It seems to be the better view, and is that adopted by
those courts which have given the problem due consideration, that unless there is actually some sort of
coercion, such as brute force; subtle intimidations, Elmore v. Commonwealth, 282 Ky. 443, 138 S. W. 2d 956
(1940); threats, Manning v. Commonwealth, 328 S. W.
2d 421 (Ky. 1959); or trickery, Gouled v. United States,
255 U. S. 298, 41 S. Ct. 261, 65 L. Ed. 647 (1921), the
court should find that the permission was freely and voluntarily given. The doctrine of implied coercion should
not, it is submitted, be distorted in an effort to develop,
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via the backdoor, a rule that wives, parents, and children
can never consent to a search of the premises.
I.

CAN MEMBERS OF SUSPECT'S FAMILY GIVE
EFFECTIVE CONSENT?
Preface

Now the consideration shifts to the second problem:
even if the permission was freely and intelligently given
under the rules laid down in the first section of this article, can such permission ever be valid against a suspect
when given by a member of his family?
This section is subdivided into discussions of consent
of the parents, children, and spouses, respectively.
Parents give the courts few perplexing moments because
the parents of the suspect usually have a definite possessory and/or proprietary interest in the property which
provides a logical basis for a valid consent; thus, a thread
of rationale runs through the cases involving consent of
parents. There are so few cases concerning consent of
children that no general rule or rationale can be enunciated; therefore, a statement of the holdings of a handful of these cases is all that will be attempted. The discussion of consent of the spouse is reserved until last,
because herein lie the enigmas and the irreconciliable
views.
A. Consent of Parents
Few cases can be found which refute the general notion
that parents of the suspect can validly consent to a search
of the premises and a seizure of evidence. This notion
is based on the fact that the parents invariably have a
possessory or proprietary interest in the property; i.e.,
they either own the property or have definite control and
custody of the premises at the time of the search. Accepting the postulate that a possessory or proprietary
interest may serve as a valid basis for consenting to a
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search, some sort of rationale can be observed in most
of the cases concerned with whether the parents can
ever consent to a search of the premises.
When the suspect does not even live at the home of his
parents, the courts are agreed that the parents can permit a search of the premises. This was the circumstance
in Rees, the Virginia case in which the defendant had
grown up in the parents' home but had moved away and
was only visiting the home on occasions. The father
signed a written permission to search, and the mother
verbally assented. When the gun, suspected of being the
murder weapon, was found in the house, the father allowed the F.B.I. agents to take the weapon. The Supreme Court of Appeals adopted the ably-written opinion of the trial judge, in which it was concluded that the
parents of a defendant can effectively consent to a
search of the household over which they have control.
A similar situation confronted a federal court in Pennsylvania in the case of United States ex ret. Puntariv.
Maroney, 220 F. Supp. 801 (W. D. Pa. 1963). In denying
a writ of habeas corpus the court said that "an accused
cannot object to a search of another's premises if the
latter consents." The parents owned the home; the defendant lived elsewhere and was only visiting the parents
at the time that he committed the crime. The defendant's
conviction of robbery had been upheld in Commonwealth
v. Puntari,198 Pa. Super. 70, 181 A. 2d 719 (1962), and
an appeal from this decision had been dismissed in
Puntariv. Pennsylvania, 372 U. S. 708, 83 S. Ct. 1021,
10 L. Ed. 2d 127 (1962).
A more difficult question is raised where the defendant lives with his parents on the premises searched,
but the courts have generally found that here, too, the
parent's consent is valid because of the possessory or
proprietary interest of the parents. A recent well-reasoned case enunciating this rule is Maxwell v. Stephens,
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229 F. Supp. 205 (E. D. Ark. 1964). The defendant had
been convicted of rape and sentenced to death, and this
had been affirmed in Maxwell v. State, 236 Ark. 694, 370
S. W. 2d 113 (1963). He then sought a writ of habeas
corpus. The defendant shared a room with two brothers
in the home of his parents. After he had been arrested,
officers went to the home and were given permission to
enter by the mother of the defendant. The father was at
work. After concluding that the mother had given her
permission freely and intelligently, the District Court
held that such consent was a valid waiver of the defendant's constitutional right to a search warrant. The court
pointed out that "the mother ... had sole control, power
and, at the time, the superior right to exclude others
from not only her home but also from the very room
which petitioner shared with his brothers." The denial
of the writ was affirmed in 348 F. 2d 325 (8th Cir. 1965).
In McCray v. State, 236 Md. 9, 202 A. 2d 320 (1964),
the defendant's father, who owned the home, invited the
officers into the home, and into the room in which the
defendant slept. Later, however, the father and mother
refused to sign an authorization for the search. But the
court still concluded that there had been a valid waiver
of the defendant's rights to a search warrant, because
the father had initially invited the officers into the house
and had agreed to a search of the room which defendant
occupied. See also: Gray v. Commonwealth, 198 Ky. 610,
249 S. W. 769 (1923) and Tomlinson v. State, 129 Fla.
658, 176 So. 543 (1937).
Distinguishable are the cases in which the parent is
only a visitor in the suspect's home, or in which the suspect pays rent for the exclusive possession and occupation of a room in the parent's home. In these cases, the
courts generally hold that the parent's consent is not an
effective waiver of the suspect's constitutional guarantee against search and seizure without a warrant, be-
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cause the parent had no interest in the property searched.
See Annot., 31 A. L. R. 2d 1078 (1953).
B. Consent of Children
Since there are few cases involving consent of children of the suspect, there can be found no general rule
or rationale, and it is almost impossible to say how the
courts will deal with the problems involved. It is difficult to see how a young child could "freely and intelligently" consent to a search of the premises under any
circumstances. Therefore, the court probably would
strike down such permission on the grounds that the
child was simply incapable of understanding the significance of his act. If the child were older and more responsible, -a more difficult problem would face the court,
but it seems likely that most courts would refuse to recognize such invitation to the premises as an effective
consent.
In United States v. Linderman, 32 F. Supp. 123
(E.D.N.Y. 1940), the court said that the child's invitation to the officers to enter the house did not "rise to the
dignity of a consent"; rather, the court termed it a
"submission." (But the evidence was held to be correctly admitted in this case because the search was
conducted by state officers-Mapp v. Ohio had not yet
been decided.) The child's age was not disclosed in the
opinion.
In People v. Jennings, 142 Cal. App. 2d 160, 298 P. 2d
56 (1956), officers questioned two teen-age daughters
of the defendant for two hours during the middle of the
night. Then, the oldest daughter accompanied the officers on a search of the basement, where incriminating
evidence was discovered. The court held that there was
no evidence that the girls had consented to the search
and that, even if they had been asked to consent, it
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would be idle to suppose that they would have objected.
A recent case which has been cited as authority for
the proposition that a child can waive the suspect's constitutional guarantees is Davis v. United States, 327 F.
2d 301 (9th Cir. 1964). But the case does not stand for
that proposition. In Davis, officers went to the suspect's
house to talk to him about his alleged possession of
marijuana. The officers had no intention of searching
the premises or of arresting the suspect when they
entered the house with the permission of an eight-yearold daughter of the suspect. But once in the living room,
the officers saw marijuana and arrested the suspect. The
court upheld the conviction of the child's father, and
held that the child had not consented to a search and
seizure but had only invited the officers into the house to
talk with her father. "When the one who opens the door
says, 'Come in'," the court said, "neither the time, nor
the officers' intent, nor the total circumstances, nor the
Fourth Amendment demands that they remain outside."
(327 F. 2d at 305).
C. Consent of Spouse
The largest number of cases concerning third-party
consent involves wives who, in the absence of their husbands, permit officers to enter and search the premises.
Since most courts are reluctant to permit such a waiver,
they are especially prone in their zeal to reverse convictions in these cases to confuse the problem involving
freely-given consent with the separate and distinct problem of the spouse's capacity, under any circumstances,
to give effective consent. Several cases illustrate the
way in which some courts have misinterpreted and misapplied Amos, the Supreme Court decision which held
that the wife did not give an effective consent to a
search of the premises because of the "implied coercion" of the officers. As stated above, the Court express-
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ly said that it was not deciding in Amos whether a wife
could effectively consent to such a search in other circumstances. But ten years after Amos, in Cofer v. United
States, 37 F. 2d 677 (5th Cir. 1930), a federal court held
that the wife could not bind the husband with her consent to a search of his premises. The court relied on
Amos to support this broad statement, although Amos
clearly does not stand for that proposition. But there
was an additional factor in Cofer which justified a reversal of the conviction: the officers had used an invalid search warrant when they approached the wife
with a request to search the house. Certainly the wife's
acquiescence to a search which she thought was pursuant
to a search warrant was not an effective consent. The
court did not need to over-extend the doctrine of Amos
to reach this result.
Similarly, in Simmons v. State, 94 Okla. Or. 18, 229
P. 2d 615 (1951), the court used Amos to support its
view that neither husband nor wife can waive the other's
Fourth Amendment guarantee.
A 1938 Illinois case provides the final illustration of
the confusion of the problem of freely-given consent
with the problem involving the spouse's capacity to consent. In People v. Lind, 370 Ill. 131, 18 N. E. 2d 189
(1938), the court began its opinion apparently intending
to discuss whether or not the wife had given her consent
freely and intelligently. But before concluding that the
case was "tinged with official coercion" and thus following Amos, the court rambled for several paragraphs,
discussing the views supported by many decisions that a
wife can never consent to a search of her husband's
property. To accept, literally, all that the court said in
Lind, one would readily conclude that Illinois prohibits
any consensual waiver by the wife, no matter how freely
given. A recent Illinois case shows that many of the
broad declarations of Lind had nothing to do with the
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true holding in that case. In People v. Harvey, 48 ILI.
App. 2d 261, 199 N. E. 2d 236 (1964), the wife gave a
written authorization to the officers to search the premises. The court held, without any reference to Lind, that
this was definitely a case of freely-given consent, and
thus served as an effective waiver of the husband's
Fourth Amendment rights. The court said that where
two persons have equal rights to the use or occupancy
of the premises, either can consent to a search thereof.
There is a brighter side however. Many of the courts
distinguish the problem of freely-given consent from
that of the spouse's ability to waive the suspect's rights
to a search warrant, and dispose of the two problems
separately. In a recent case of first impression which
involved Virginia law enforcement officers, the North
Carolina court treated the problem ably. In State v.
Hall, 264 N. C. 559, 142 S. E. 2d 177 (1965), officers of
North Carolina and Virginia searched the defendant's
home in Norfolk after identifying themselves to the defendant's wife and gaining her permission to search the
premises. The husband had been incarcerated in the
Norfolk jail. Incriminating evidence was found which
led to the defendant's conviction of larceny in North
Carolina. The court first disposed of the question of
voluntary consent. The court said that it was not convinced that the wife was at liberty to object to the search.
This was because of the number of policemen which confronted the wife and the fact that she knew that her
husband was -already in the local jail. The court made
reference to Amos, which was relevant to the issue being discussed. Then, the court moved on to discuss
another question. If she had voluntarily consented, could
the wife effectively waive her husband's rights to a
search warrant? The court answered this question in
the negative, adopting the view that the wife can never
consent to a search of the husband's dwelling.
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The majority of well-reasoned cases, like Hall, reach
the same conclusion as the poorly-analyzed opinions,
and hold that the wife cannot under any circumstances
waive her husband's constitutional rights (unless, of
course, he has given her express authority to do so).
47 Am. Jur. Search and Seizure §72 (1943).
The Arizona court followed the majority without reservation in State v. Pina, 94 Ariz. 243, 383 P. 2d 167
(1963), when it stated, "A third person cannot waive
another's basic constitutional rights against unlawful
search and seizure unless specifically authorized." This
emphatic statement seems to preclude the argument,
used in some cases, that the wife may have been given
"implied authority" to supervise the premises, and thus
to consent to a search, when the husband is away from
the house. In an oft-cited Indiana case, the court held
that the wife could not consent to the search and seizure
of the automobile which was used exclusively by the
husband, although the certificate of ownership was in
the wife's name. Dalton v. State, 230 Ind. 626, 105 N. E.
2d 509, 31 A. L. R. 2d 1071 (1952). The court said that
the husband had not given the wife authority, express
or implied, to consent to a search of the property over
which he had control.
Varon contends that the courts adhering to the majority view base their decisions upon the idea that the
husband is head of the household, and cannot be said
to have given the wife implied authority to consent to a
search thereof. I VARoN, Searches, Seizures, and Immunities 433 (1961).
Thus, the cases representing the majority view that
the wife cannot consent to a search of the premises, are
in keeping with the current trend toward expanding
the individual's guarantees under the Bill of Rights.
As long as the courts do not confound the two problems
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discussed in this article, as did some in the illustrations
noted above, this view rests on persuasive logic.
But the minority view, too, is supported by sound
principles. The California court has best explained this
view. In People v. Carter,48 Cal. 2d 737, 312 P. 2d 665
(1957), the court held that the wife could effectively
consent to a search of the premises if such consent were
voluntarily given. Justice Traynor said:
The problem calls for a determination of whether
the wife's relation to her husband and his property
is such that there is no invasion of his privacy if she
consents.
When the husband is absent from the home, it is
the wife who controls the premises, the ordinary
household property, the family automobile, and with
her husband's tacit consent determines who shall
and who shall not enter the house on business or
pleasure and what property they may take away.
When the usual amicable relations exist between
the husband and wife, and the property seized is of
a kind over which the wife normally exercises as
much control as the husband, it is reasonable to conclude that she is in a position to consent to a search
and seizure in their home. (312 P. 2d at 670).
One authority who disagrees with this line of reasoning and would prefer the result reached in Pina and
Dalton, nevertheless acknowledges the good logic behind
the position taken by the minority:
It is the factor of joint ownership and control over
the premises subject to the search that binds the
husband in those jurisdictions validating the wife's
consent i.e., the wife is consenting not as an agent
but as an occupant entitled to equal control of the
premises. Belefonte, The Effect of the Wife's Con-
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sent to a Search and Seizure of the Husband'sProperty, 69 DIcK L. REv. 69, 74 (1964).
The Hawaii court, in State v. Evans, 45 Hawaii 622,
372 P. 2d 365 (1962), apparently accepted the minority
view that the wife can consent to a search of premises,
but held that under the circumstances of that case, the
wife did not have "joint ownership and control over
the premises subject to the search." The officers found
stolen jewelry in the husband's cuff link box. Since
the minority view is based on the idea of joint ownership and control, Evans reached a sound result in standing for the proposition that exclusively-private parts
of the home, such as cuff link boxes, desk drawers, etc.,
are out of reach of the other spouse and thus immune
from a search conducted with the consent of the other
spouse.
It is submitted that those courts which have relied on
Amos to support their declarations that the spouse can
never consent to a search have confused the problems unnecessarily to bolster their efforts to invalidate all consensual waivers attempted by the wife of the suspect.
These courts may not have reached the wrong results,
but they have used faulty reasoning, failed to recognize
the problem, and evidenced a less-than-intensive study
of this area of the law.
As for those courts which have separated the two
problems as this article has attempted to do, there are
still two clearly defined views on whether the wife should
be allowed to give consent, but at least the courts have
a clear understanding of the perplexities involved, and
base their holdings on logical reasoning and careful
thought.
EI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
The purpose of this article is to survey the problems
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involved when a member of the suspect's family consents to a search of the premises without the suspect's
express authorization. There are two looming problems,
and, at the risk of tedium, they are restated:
(1) The problem of freely-given consent.
(2) The problem of capacity of a particular person
to consent for another.
I. The first problem dealt with the question of what
constitutes consent, and with the standards which the
courts have laid down to safeguard the idea of consensual waiver as it applies to situations when one other
than the suspect is making the waiver. In analyzing any
case in this field of the law, if the analyst finds that the
permission was not given voluntarily and intelligently,
under the rules discussed in §I of this article, there is
no need to proceed with the inquiry as the search and
seizure is invalid.
II. The second section discussed each member of the
family who may attempt to consent to a search of the
premises and that person's capacity to make an effective
waiver of the suspect's right to a warrant, assuming
throughout the discussion that the standards discussed
under Problem No. 1 had been met so that the attempted
consent was given freely.
A. Parents do not give much trouble to the courts because they usually have a definite possessory or proprietary interest in the premises. This provides a logical,
and legally-acceptable, basis for consent.
B. Children have thus far caused relatively little confusion because of the paucity of cases on the point. It
is apparent that a small child could not measure up to
the standards required under the first problem. Although
older and more responsible children could "freely and
intelligently" permit a search, it is doubtful that the
courts would permit the consent to be effectual because
of policy reasons.
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. As for wives ...
(1) The majority of courts says that the wife cannot
consent to a search of the premises, based on the notion
that the husband is head of the household and has given
her no implied authority to permit such searches and
seizures. However, many of these courts, in their zeal
to reach this result, misapply cases, make unnecessarily
broad declarations, and/or fail to research the issues
efficiently, thereby confusing the two problems dealt
with in this article.
(2) The minority says that she can consent, and bases
its decisions on the proposition that joint occupancy
permits either occupant to consent to a search.

